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Burkina Faso in Crisis: Navigating Humanitarian Disaster and Armed Conflict
- Ria Nair
- Apr 30, 2024
- 9 min read
Updated: Jun 24, 2024
INTRODUCTION
Background
“Nothing will be like before!” (Amnesty International, 2015)
This slogan was heard echoing through the streets of Burkina Faso in sight of national democracy in 2015. The Burkinabe people could not have been more ill-prepared for what was to come.
Burkina Faso, once known as Upper Volta, is a landlocked country, sharing borders with six countries: Mali to the North and West, Niger to the East, Benin to the Southeast, Togo, and Ghana to the South, and Côte d’Ivoire to the Southwest. Burkina Faso’s geographic position has not only shaped its identity but also played a pivotal role in the development of complex challenges it faces today (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023).
Source: Norwegian Refugee Council
As of 2024, Burkina Faso is grappling with a humanitarian crisis. More than six million people are in need, with more than two million reported as displaced, and three million facing severe food insecurity (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA 2024). Further according to the OCHA report (2024), despite the urgent need for aid, Burkina Faso the Humanitarian Response Plan for Burkina Faso was only 37% funded in 2023. The country continues to endure unending human rights violations owing to conflict-related violence resulting in over 7600 deaths in no less than two thousand incidents in 2023 alone (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
Burkina Faso’s descent into crisis can be traced back to pivotal events in 2014 when President Blaise Compaoré’s attempts to amend the constitution and extend his 27-year rule sparked a national uprising. This period of upheaval culminated in Compaoré’s resignation and the subsequent democratic election of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in 2015. However, the vacuum left by Compaoré’s departure created a power struggle and laid the groundwork for heightened political tensions and instability. Amidst this internal turmoil, Burkina Faso found itself increasingly vulnerable to external threats, particularly the spillover of conflict from neighbouring Mali.
Source: Al Jazeera
The destabilization of Mali following the Tuareg rebellion and subsequent Islamist insurgency had far-reaching repercussions for Burkina Faso’s security landscape. The porous borders between the two nations facilitated the movement of arms, militants, and extremist ideologies, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities within the country. This facilitated the infiltration of jihadist groups such as Ansaroul Islam and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, which exploited the power vacuum and grievances among marginalized communities to establish a foothold in the country (Perez, 2019). The rise of jihadist insurgencies within Burkina Faso’s borders marked a significant escalation of violence and insecurity, posing a multifaceted set of threats to the nation’s stability and the safety of its citizens.
Parties to the Conflict
Burkina Faso is entangled in a complex web of conflicts involving the Burkinabe government against several jihadist groups – Ansaroul Islam, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), also known as Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam Wali Muslimin – JNIM) (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023). Additionally, various self-defence militias are operating in the country, but their limited organization and lower intensity of violence make it difficult to definitively categorize them as participants in the conflicts against jihadist groups. Furthermore, France had also been actively involved in Burkina Faso from 2014 to 2023 through Operation Barkhane, conducted with the approval of the Burkinabe government. (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, 2019)
Classification: International Armed Conflict (IAC) or Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC)
In assessing the conflict dynamics in Burkina Faso, it is essential to determine whether the prevailing armed violence meets the criteria for classification as either an International Armed Conflict (IAC) or a Non- International Armed Conflict (NIAC) under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). While each crisis possesses unique nuances, this classification relies on specific criteria being met. This section delves into why the situation in Burkina Faso aligns more closely with the characteristics of a NIAC rather than an IAC.
To begin, it is crucial to recognize that the conflict qualifies as an armed conflict, as defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (2000), “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence, between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” Considering the parties involved in the conflict, it is evident that the confrontation between the Burkinabe government and jihadist groups meets this criterion.
However, according to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), an International Armed Conflict (IAC) is defined as, “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” In the case of Burkina Faso, the conflict does not unfold between two High Contracting Parties but rather involves the government confronting jihadist groups designated as non-state armed parties, thereby precluding its classification as an IAC. Conversely, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) defines a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) as any, “armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” This encompasses conflicts involving non-governmental armed forces and groups, or conflicts occurring solely within such groups. The armed conflict in Burkina Faso, hence, aligns more closely with the criteria for a NIAC due to its internal nature and involvement of non-state armed groups. However, categorizing an armed conflict as an NIAC relies on two core elements:
A specific degree of intensity in the armed violence, surpassing mere internal unrest and tensions.
While various factors assess whether a conflict satisfies the intensity threshold, certain indicative factors (ICTY, 2000) can be considered for a thorough assessment of the situation; duration and intensity of military confrontations, the type of military equipment used, number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting, number of casualties, the extent of material destruction and the involvement of UN, ICRC or other international institutions.
The security of Burkina Faso weakened since former President Compaoré stepped down from office and the dismantling of the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP). Taking advantage of the political and security instability in the country in 2015, several jihadist groups started operating, especially in the rural areas. Ansaroul Islam, allegedly in cooperation with the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) claimed responsibility for the first time (Le Roux, 2019) for attacking in 2016 on the Nassoumbou military base, resulting in the death of 12 Burkinabe soldiers. This prompted the government to deploy more troops to counter them. With jihadist groups active in Burkina Faso, continuously attacking security forces and civilians over the past several years, the violence has escalated with villages massacred and soldiers targeted in 2024 (International Crisis Group, ICG, 2024). France intervened in 2014 through Operation Barkhane (ECFR, 2019), and by 2020, the Burkinabe parliament authorized the military to train and deploy civilian volunteers due to being “outnumbered” (Aljazeera, 2020). Violence and its collateral in the form of displacement of individuals has only worsened over time, with over one million internally displaced persons in 2020 (IOM, 2020) and over two million people in 2024 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees. UNHCR, 2024). Tensions among jihadist groups have also increased, from the ISGS expanding activities into JNIM territory in 2020 to disagreement on functioning (Mednick, 2020).
The non-state armed parties to the conflict must demonstrate a particular level of organization.
Ansaroul Islam, NIM, ISGS, and ISWAP, along with various self-defence groups, contribute to the organized nature of the conflict in Burkina Faso, fulfilling the criteria for a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). Ansaroul Islam, founded by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, initially operated as a cohesive group with a clear leadership structure, despite subsequent internal divisions after Dicko’s death (Le Roux, 2019). Similarly, JNIM emerged as an umbrella organization comprising several jihadist groups, demonstrating a high level of organization, coordination, and strategizing. The organization has internationally recognized leaders, and a structure based on unity and similar ideologies, allowing the group to be cohesive, yet adaptable (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023). The ISGS and ISWAP, though traditionally rivals, have cooperated at times and demonstrated organizational capacity in conducting military operations (ICG, 2020). Additionally, self-defense groups, while not as unified, have established networks and exert influence across various regions, contributing to the overall organization of the conflict. Furthermore, while the country has faced attacks since 2015, the humanitarian situation has hit a record high as the junta-led government began a “total war” against the jihadist insurgents, which have claimed more than 40% of the national territory (Aljazeera, 2022).
Therefore, based on the heightened intensity of armed violence to the extent that foreign parties and civilians became involved, the armed capacity of the insurgents coupled with the level of organization demonstrated by the conflicting parties led to the seizure of national territory, which persists despite internal insecurity, the situation in Burkina Faso fulfils the criteria for classification as a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).
Atrocities Against the People of Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso continues to suffer one of the world’s fastest-growing displacement crises (IRC, 2024), with more than 800,000 people living under blockade since a political coup overthrew former President Kaboré, just 8 months into his re-election in 2020. Capt. Ibrahim Traoré was installed as president in 2022, while the armed jihadist groups coupled with the state security forces and pro-government militias continued to cause mayhem in the rest of the country. While the junta-led government sports their “Security-First” policy (Reuters, 2023), the Burkinabe people have found themselves lacking necessities and continue to face multiple atrocities; several Burkinabe cities were besieged by armed terrorist groups, effectively blocking necessities and humanitarian aid to the population, hence causing starvation and spreading illnesses amongst the residents and internally displaced people (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
According to USAID (2023), the country lies in dire need of assistance with food, health services, water, sanitation, and hygiene services, with the displacement and disruption of livelihoods having worsened by food insecurity and hindered conflict-afflicted households’ access to farmland, livestock, and markets, according to the UN. While more than two million people in the country are internally displaced, the conflict has also led to the public service sector being immensely overwhelmed in light of the school (approximately 1 in 4) and healthcare facility closures (IRC, 2024). Furthermore, adding to the existent severe lack of access to food and sources of income, a dredging climate crisis upon the population, and the deterioration of the public services sector, the Burkinabe stay in constant fear for their lives from not only the jihadist groups but also the military junta (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The jihadist groups have attacked government buildings and schools, executed those suspected of collaborating with the government, and conducted assaults on cafes and other public gathering spaces (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The country has faced execution- style killings, intimidation, and village massacres over the years and no one party is responsible for all these atrocities; all of the parties to the conflict share the blame for the suffering of the Burkinabe people. In 2017, Ansaroul Islam attacked and burned a school, while threatening the teachers against teaching (Human Rights Watch, 2018); Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM attacked the Burkinabè army headquarters and French embassy in 2018, killing two military personnel and wounding hundreds of civilians; ISGS claimed responsibility for the April 8, 2018, attack that killed Hamidou Koundaba, the mayor of the Koutougou commune, accusing him of collaborating with the government.
Source: Human Rights Watch
The state security forces were also implicated in massacres of villages and individuals suspected of sympathizing with jihadist gr oups (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The population of Burkina Faso withstands the worst of violent conflict, enduring displacement, food insecurity, and humanitarian crises compounded by atrocities committed by various parties to the conflict. The atrocities underscore the urgent need for international intervention and concerted efforts to restore peace and stability.
Humanitarian Assistance Across the International Arena
The Burkina Faso crisis, characterized by escalating violence and a growing humanitarian crisis emergency, has elicited a significant response from the international community. Various international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), have assisted in their capacities. The IOM, for instance, has proposed a response objective of $13.3 million to assist 30,000 people in need (The International Organization for Migration, IOM, 2024). Conversely, the IRC has been providing urgent and lifesaving assistance, including clean water, sanitation services, and healthcare (IRC, 2024). Furthermore, other international aid organizations such as ShelterBox and HELP have come together to support vulnerable families, where they have supported over 4,000 families since 2020, by providing necessities like blankets, sleeping mats, and soap. They have also collaborated with the locals to build durable tents for hygiene and privacy (ShelterBox).
However, despite these efforts, the response has been insufficient. The 2023 humanitarian response plan received only 36.8% of the necessary funding (OCHA, 2024). This underfunding has left a gap in the provision of much-needed aid and services. As of 2024, an estimated 6.3 million people need humanitarian assistance across Burkina Faso’s 13 regions (OCHA, 2024). This is a 13% increase compared to 2023 (IRC, 2024).
Source: MSF
Moreover, the crisis in Burkina Faso has escaped global attention, with the country now ranking as the world’s most neglected displacement crisis for the first time (IRC, 2024). This oversight has resulted in a severe shortage of resources, worsening the humanitarian situation. Lastly, the situation for the on-ground humanitarian aid workers has been deteriorating as well, especially since the two aid workers part of the ‘Doctors Without Borders’ program were killed in 2023 (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF, 2023). Aid workers and organizations continue to grow wary of their safety in sight of the increasing insecurity on all fronts.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso represents one of the most pressing challenges facing the international community today. With millions of people in need of urgent assistance and ongoing conflict exacerbating the situation, concerted efforts are required to address the root causes of the crisis and alleviate the suffering of the Burkinabe people.
The classification of the conflict in Burkina Faso as a Non-Internal Armed Conflict (NIAC) underscores the gravity of the situation. This distinction highlights the internal nature of the conflict and the involvement of non-state armed groups, emphasizing the need for tailored responses that prioritize the protection of civilians and adherence to international humanitarian law.
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About the author: Ria is a final year Master’s student of Diplomacy, Law, and Business at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She has an affinity for communication, be it through written or spoken word. Her research interests consist of human security, conflict and governance.
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